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~~SECRET~~

16 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/FP

SUBJECT : Communist Penetration of Guatemala

1. The enclosures transmitted herewith under the general subject "Communist Penetration of Guatemala" have been prepared in response to your request for intelligence materials to be used in the development of information and propaganda for support of the U.S. delegation of the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas.

2. It is our understanding that these materials are desired for the use of writers and speakers who will develop the information to suit special needs and opportunities of expression. We therefore have prepared this first over-all summary as a preliminary presentation of the thesis on which we are working. The thesis is stated in Attachment No. 1.

3. The supplementary materials transmitted as Attachments 5, 6, 7 and 8 have been prepared in semi-outline form for use as reference by writers and speakers in relation to the subject outline which appears in Attachment No. 2.

4. The present enclosures are to be taken as preliminary and "sample" submissions of materials which will be more completely checked and edited, and compiled into a kit for the use of writers and speakers and members of the American delegation at the Conference.

5. In view of the very limited time available for this work, and the large amount of evidence which must be reviewed and coordinated, we propose to develop the support materials subject by subject in conformity with the outline and so as to complete the kit in final form for distribution to the American delegation, by February 23.

6. In the meanwhile, if desired, we can make available draft copies of the data developed on individual subjects and key personalities on a daily basis, as completed.

[redacted]
Chief, RQM/OIS

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Attachments
As stated above

Attachments

1. Communist Penetration of Guatemala - Thesis.
2. Topic Outline.
3. A Communist Minority Controls Guatemala - Summary.
4. Role of Guatemala in Soviet Plan for World Domination - Summary.
5. Communist Penetration of Guatemalan Labor Organizations - Chronology.
6. Communist Capture and Manipulation of Political Parties - Outline.
7. Communist Penetration of Guatemalan Institute of Social Security - Outline.
8. Biographic Information: Roberto Morena

of Guatemala

Attachment No. 1

## COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF GUATEMALA

THESIS:

1. A Communist minority has achieved practical control over the direction of Guatemalan institutions and policies.

2. The leaders of this minority receive directives from the leaders of International Communism.

3. Communist minorities took control and delivered to USSR domination the formerly free countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Poland and others.

4. The pattern of events in Guatemala.

5. The similarity of the pattern of events in Guatemala to the pattern of Communist take-over in other countries is a warning to which the non-Communist majority in Guatemala and the other American Republics should take heed.

Attachment No. 2

## Communist Penetration of Guatemala

Outline:

I. Communist Minority Dominates Guatemala

II. Guatemalan Communists Linked to International Communism

- A. International Communist/Labor Leaders Visit Guatemala
- B. Guatemalan Communist/Labor Leaders Visit Centers of International Communism

III. Guatemalan Trends Follow Pattern of Communist Take-Over in Other Countries.

- A. Penetration and Manipulation of Administration Political Parties
- B. Penetration of Labor Movement
- C. Penetration of the Government
  1. Control of Executive
  2. Control of Press and Propaganda
  3. Control of National Electoral Board
  4. Control of Supreme Court
  5. Control of National Social Service Institute
  6. Control of Agrarian Department
  7. Penetration of Ministry of Education
  8. Penetration of Ministry of Economy and Labor
  9. Penetration of Ministry of Communications
- D. Neutralization of Armed Forces

IV. The Role of Guatemala in the Soviet Plan of World Domination.

Attachment No. 3

I. A COMMUNIST MINORITY DOMINATES GUATEMALA

The direction of Guatemalan affairs has been captured by a Communist minority. This minority does not represent the people of Guatemala. Numerically, the Communist nucleus, with 500 registered party members and only four deputies out of 56 in Congress, is so small that its ability to dominate, take over, and then betray the revolution of 1944 and the sovereignty of this nation of three million people, has seemed incredible to many responsible thinkers both inside and outside the country. However, by gradual penetration, betrayal and eclipse of the moderate forces which tried to accept their cooperation, the Communist minority has been able to spread its net of power until the Supreme Court, the Congress and the Executive itself have been brought under their domination, and the army neutralized. Where the leaders of this small group have encountered resistance, they have been able, through the use of propaganda, terrorism, and the ruthless extreme of assassination, been able either to discourage, discredit or extirpate the opposition of those citizens who have become awakened to the true nature and intent of this movement.

This Communist minority has achieved dominance in Guatemala by a sequence of acts which can be plainly traced to a few individuals and their teachers and sponsors: the agents of International Communism, with whom they are in constant liaison. In precisely the same path of overall strategy, similar minorities accomplished the takeover and delivery of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania to Soviet masters in Moscow, and of China under Mao Tse Tung.

In all of these countries the local Communist party was used by Moscow as the method of penetration so as to paralyze the state's normal political machinery. Without attempting to secure a majority of legal support in each case these minority parties under minority leadership have exploited locally any existing grievances of the people. Working with lavish promises to abolish specificalocal ills they have typically made use of already existing and often unwitting, instruments of power to seize control and silence opposition. A core leadership has remained in close contact with Moscow; this has worked through front groups espousing particular popular causes; it has infiltrated legitimate reform movements and placed its own men in key spots in the government so as to corrode it from within. Such a sinister process now confronts us in Guatemala.

2. THE FIRST STEP FOR THE CONTROL OF GUATEMALA BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISTS WAS TO RECRUIT POTENTIAL LEADERS FROM THE SMALL GROUP OF GUATEMALAN MARXISTS AND TO GIVE THEM "ON THE JOB" TRAINING, ALL THE WHILE ASSESSING AND REASSESSING THE RECRUITS IN A SEARCH FOR THE FEW REAL LEADERS.

The Guatemalan Communist movement had been fermenting in the 1930's and early 1940's under the leadership of a loosely knit group of middle-class intel tuals who became attracted to the vogue of Marxism, and who considered Marxist principles a way out for Guatemala's social and economic problems. During this stage, Antonio Obando Sanchez and Carlos Alvarado Jeres received their first Communist Party indoctrination in Moscow and Vienna. In his fearing of the growing threat of Communism, however, President Ubico shattered his young Communist party; killed, imprisoned, and otherwise dispersed its activities.

After the consummation of the revolution of 1944, the Communists took advantage of the liberal ideology and need for political support of the first President elect and soon insinuated themselves into his confidence. There is strong reason to believe that he entered upon office already under certain obligations of politics and professed friendship to known Communists. This nucleus group became more cohesive in the early post-revolutionary period and intensified its political activity, adhering more and more closely to Marxist lines. Conscious of inexperience, they relied heavily for direction in labor and political organization on foreigners and Guatemalan exiles who had been involved in Communist activities in other Latin American nations and who flocke to Guatemala after the 1944 Revolution, largely unsuspected by the honest liber and unnoticed by the outside world.

The principal foreign group consisted of Salvadoran Communist exiles, including Miguel MARMOL Chicas, Abel and Max CUENCA Martinez, brothers; and Virgilio GUERRA Mendez. They were joined by two native Communists, Antonio OVANDO Sanchez, who had been imprisoned by UBICO, and Alfonso SOLORZANO Fernand who had fled to Mexico, where he worked with LOMBARDO Toledano.

3. Manipulation of the labor force. In Guatemala, labor organization was rudimentary; there was not, as in most other countries, a single, unified labor confederation which the Communists could take over. Instead, they undertook th job of both creating and of unifying. Their objectives and their basic strateg were identical, however, with those already displayed in other formerly free countries now under Soviet domination. The procedure was tactically modified i

order to meet the peculiarities of the situation in Guatemala. They worked simultaneously to obtain control and unify existing unions, as they stimulated and guided the creation of new unions among hitherto unorganized workers such as the campesinos. As the process of organization and unification advanced, the Communist leaders used labor so as to exert pressure on the Government, precisely as was done in the case of Czechoslovakia. In Guatemala, one concession after another was extracted from the Government in exchange for delivery of the growing blocks of labor votes. Each concession won strengthened the hand of the Communist-controlled labor groups; the Communist leaders are now engaged in working through legislative power to lessen those controls which Government still retains over labor. It will then become a still more potent weapon of influence upon the whole direction of national affairs.

A common Communist operational technique is to effect the greatest degree of complementary control over labor and political organizations, the most important elements necessary to achieve political control within a country. It is not necessary to achieve strength in numbers, merely in influence.

The first step was to exploit the tolerant climate and imperfect organization of the liberal groups of the 1944 Revolution. Through application of the "divide and rule" tactic of playing on the rivalries and jealousies of the other parties, the Communists kept the dominant non-Communists from fully developing among the rank and file. Thus, we find Jose Manuel Fortuny elected as Deputy to Congress in March 1945 as a far leftists member of the Popular Front of Liberation. In 1946, he joined the Party of Revolutionary Action (P.A.R.), the pro-Government party, and thence occupied various top posts. In January 1946, Victor Manuel Gutierrez was elected Deputy to Congress on the CTG ticket. In 1945-46 leading Communists of the stature of Abel CUENCA Martinez, Luis CARDOZA y Aragon, Carlos Manuel PELLECER and several others were appointed to high positions in the Guatemalan Government and foreign services, ~~either's service in Moscow and~~

This program of infiltration and penetration cannot be presented as a complete picture of Communist activity until it is shown how institutions and groups concerned with propaganda and education fit into the pattern of conspiracy. A few months after the beginning of the administration of Pres. Arevalo, a militant Communist originally from Chile, Virginia BRAVO Letelier, was established at the head of a department in the Ministry of education. Her office became a meeting place for visiting international Communists and a headquarters between her journeys to Eastern Europe. Fortuny was appointed after heavy pressure as a

member of the newly created Department of Press, Propaganda and Tourism, an adjunct of the Presidential office, while Pedro Goeffrey Rivas soon became Chief of Propaganda and Director of the government broadcasting station.

In the process of extending their influence, this numerically small group of conspirators created new labor, political and social-cultural organizations or fronts with complex inter-locking directorates. These groups systematically undermined and destroyed any existing organization not willing to yield to their domination. The Syndicate of Guatemalan Workers in Education was founded with the help of Fortuny; the Syndicate of Revolutionary Intellectual and Artistic Workers, the Saker-Ti association of young artists and writers, the Feminine Alliance of Guatemala, the Federation of Democratic Youth of Guatemala are a few of these organizations. The two last named are affiliates of International Communist organizations. The same nucleus of leadership formed the Guatemalan National Pro-Peace Committee. Many non-Communist liberals and progressives were drawn into these Communist-led organizations which were really substitutes for (the party). A Communist Party as yet not so named and, under guidance from international advisers, scheduled to remain concealed in definitely under other names.

The years up to 1948 were years of calculated penetration and entrenchment of Communist into the institutions, agencies and government of the Guatemalan people, under cover of names and causes deliberately chosen and created by International Communism for the purpose of concealment.

II. GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS LINKED TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Guatemalan Communists took their first step toward power in 1944, by moving in on the liberal revolution and exploiting the tolerant climate and imperfect organization of the genuine revolutionary groups.

The repeated visits of International Communist agents, representatives and collaborators to Guatemala are common knowledge. It is equally well known that these International Communist agents are met at the airport by, or make direct

contact soon after their arrival with the principal figures in the Communist minority nucleus of Guatemala: the PGT (Guatemalan Communist Party) secretary general, the CGTG (Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala) secretary of conflicts, the CGTG vice-secretary of communications and acts and the CGTG general, who is also a Communist deputy.

What have been the circumstances and consequences of these visits? Is there a chain of command from Moscow to Guatemala, which Guatemalan Communist minority obeys? Or are these incidents fortuitous and coincidental, unrelated to the over-all program for world domination of Russian Communism? The record speaks for itself:

A. International Communist Labor Leaders Visit Guatemala

1. Penetration of Guatemalan institutions by agents of International Communism began even before consolidation of the October victory of the 1944 revolution. Trained, paid agents of Moscow, taking advantage of the liberal ideology and need for political support of the first president elected after consummation of the revolution, insinuated themselves into his confidence at an early time. There is strong reason to believe that he came to office, unfortunately, already under certain obligations of politics and professed friendship, to such known agents. At any rate, within a few months after his administration began, Virginia BRAVO Letelier, a convinced and militant Communist from Chile, whose build resembles that of Ana PAUKER and whose energy in the Communist cause is stupendous, established herself on the payroll of the Guatemalan Government, at the head of a department in the Ministry of Education. During the next year of two, Nela MARTINEZ, Ecuddoran Communist, came to Guatemala and joined la BRAVO in a whirlwind campaign to bring into the Communist front the women of Guatemala, newly emerging into civic responsibility. Before she returned to Ecuador, Nela MARTINEZ wrote the basic statutes of the Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca. Virginia BRAVO stayed on, making her office in the Ministry of Education a meeting ground for visiting international Communists or a base to occupy between her journeys to Eastern Europe. From each one she returned with what can only be taken as directives for her continuing work for international Communism within the education system of Guatemala and among the young professional women she strove unceasingly to draw into the Communist organization.

2. At precisely this same period, two other well-known Chilean agents

of international Communism, Cesar GODOY Urrutia and Manuel Eduardo HUBNER Richardson, appeared in Guatemala and spent much time in counsel with the Communist minority leaders. This small group, then frankly in its formative stages, showed by many actions that it was disposed not only to accept guidance from outside sources, but indeed, to wait cautiously upon such guidance before taking major actions.

Among HUBNER Richardson's duties, it soon appeared, was the preparation of a receptive audience for the Chilean Communist poet-organizer, Pablo NERUDA. In due course, NERUDA came in person, bearing messages and directives straight from Moscow, in April 1950.

3. On 23 December 1946, one of the outstanding Communist leaders of Latin America, a Cuban best known by his alias of Blas ROCA, paid a secret visit to Guatemala. During the three days he remained in the country, he received calls from the then leaders of the FRCT, CTG and FSG, as well as political workers who today are known and active among the Communist minority.

Blas ROCA's primary and principal object in visiting Guatemala, as stated by a local collaborator at the time, was to bring personally to the labor unions the latest instructions for work toward unification of the three labor organizations of the country. He offered his collaboration and announced that a visit from Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano of Mexico, President of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de la America Latina (CTAL) could be expected at an early time. The unions in turn reported fully to Blas Roca on the formation and progress of labor organization up to that date. The Cuban Communist then publicly revealed his presence in the country with a brief, misleading announcement to the press before he departed.

4. The leading members of the Guatemalan Communist minority had established a close association with LOMBARDO Toledano and with the CTAL before the 1944 revolution. In July 1948, Lombardo paid them a visit which was but the first of a sequence of reappearances.

5. Lombardo was followed in August 1948 by Roberto MORENA, international Communist of Brazilian origin and a member of the Central Committee of CTAL.

was
MORENA ~~xxxxxxx~~ trained in Moscow in 1930. ~~Xxxxxxxxx~~, Among the front ra
there was
of the Communist minority leadership of Guatemala/ a fellow student of hi
Moscow courses, Antonio OVANDO Sanchez, who is now a member of the Central
itical Committee of the PTG. MORENA's mission of 1948 was to coordinate p
for the general Latin American "Peace" Congress, to be held under interna
Communist directives in Mexico in 1949. Before going to Guatemala, MORENA
first to Cuba, where he conferred with Lazaro PENA and Juan MARINELLO. In
Guatemala on 8 September 1948, he addressed a joint meeting of the directiv
boards of the CTG, the PSG and other labor and political party chiefs.

On 10 September, at MORENA's initiative, a meeting of Guatemalan write
artists and intellectuals was organized, sponsored by the Communist-front
(Asociacion Guatemalteca
organizations AGEAR (~~Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ de Escritores y Artistas Revo-
lucionarios), the Grupo Saker-Ti (literary organization,) and the Alianza de
Juventud Democratica Guatemalteca. The purpose of this meeting was to orga
national
a Guatemalan/committee for "Peace and Democracy" on the same lines as the "
Committee" of Mexico. Manuel Eduardo HUBNER, the Chilean Communist agent, w
on hand to help organize and address the meeting. A respected non-Communist
citizen was railroaded into the presidency of the committee and was handed a
canned statement from the CTAL to read as his inaugural address. Subsequent
he sought to remove himself from this unwelcome situation without injuring a
feelings, but he paid dearly for his independence. Within a few months the
Communists saw to it that he lost his government job~~x~~ as head of the Social
Institute. The position is now held by the Communist Solorzano.

7. Before leaving Guatemala, Roberto MORENA placed upon the willing ~~support of the~~ Communist leaders there the obligation of developing "peace committees" in support of the USSR in neighboring Central American countries. He went on with his own work of organization of the pro-Soviet "peace" progra and in July 1949 he appeared as one of the speakers at the WFTU Congress in Milan, Italy. The next fall, 25-27 November 1949, MORENA paid another visit t
executive
Guatemala. The ~~xxxxxxx~~ committee of the PSG conferred with him and he was guest of honor at the installation of the executive committee of the Federacio Regional de Trabajadores Campesinos. Thus the first assembly of the first organization of peasant and agricultural workers in Guatemala was publicly delivered by its leaders to the international Communist movement.

The organization of the "peace" movement did not get on very well in Guatemala. The few meetings attempted evoked little response. Meetings were announced in the press and then not held at all. In January 1949, reorganizati of the "peace" committee followed MORENA's visit.

From 1949 through 1953, international communist leaders visited Guatemala in a sequence illustrated below. In each case, their contact was directly with the Communist nucleus of political-labor leadership, beginning with reception at the airport by FORTUNY, GUTIERREZ, PELLECER. The Guatemalan diplomat Luis CARDOZA Y Aragon often ~~made~~ has been one of the reception committee, and throughout the period, both travel and secret communications linking Guatemala with the international Communists were facilitated through the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Conferences of local leaders beginning 3 July, 1949 with Cesar GODOY Urrutia coincided with launching on 7 July of efforts to form a "united front", typical instrument of Communist penetration.

The year 1950 reflected in Guatemala as elsewhere in the Americas, an intensified drive by international Communist for gains in the Western Hemisphere. Godoy Urrutia came from Mexico on 12 January, 1950 accompanied by the Chilean Luis Enrique DELANO, the Mexican Sixto FENANDEZ Doxcel, and the Costa Rican Vicente SAENZ, all well-known Communists. Secret conferences with local labor and political chiefs continued for one week, at the end of which they were joined by Manuel MORA Valverde, former secretary general of the Costa Rican Communist party, Vanguardia Popular, and Carlos Luis Fallas, another Costa Rican Communist.

On 21-22 January, immediately following these secret conferences, the Guatemalan National Political Workers Convention was held. The convention was the culmination of the Communist effort to form political action committees in organized labor. The leaders made it known that they planned to form the National Political Action Committee into a political party.

Six months later, on 12 June, 10 principal Communist leaders withdrew from the main political party supporting the administration, PAR, and issued a manifesto that its tenets and policies were not radical enough. Soon afterward one of the Communist leaders launched the Partido Revolucionario de Guatemala, a new "party of the working class." In July, the FORTUNY group began publication of Octubre, the newspaper which is now the official organ of the Guatemalan Communist party, PT

Foreign Communists conferred with the Guatemalan leaders in January 1951, debating the possibility of establishing a Communist Party in Guatemala.

In the same year, Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano and Louis SAILLANT came directly from Moscow to direct the CTAL-sponsored Congress of Transport Workers in Guatemala. The principal resolutions applied only to that country- the first recommending a single central union of all organized labor in Guatemala, the second, establishment of a political party of the working class.

In March 1952, the Cuban Blas ROCA returned with Juan MARINELLO, secretary general of the Cuban Communist party, and Salvador AGUIRRE, for renewed conferences with local leaders.

From 11-14 December 1953, Dionisio ENCINA, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Mexico, participated with local leaders in the secret check of delegates before opening the Second Congress of Guatemalan Labor.

The principal foreign delegate to that congress was Guiseppe CASADEI, a member of the permanent staff of the WFTU Secretariat in Vienna. It is significant that the WFTU sent this high-ranking officer to the national labor congress of one of the smallest Latin American countries. In the past, the WFTU has sent representatives to regional labor congress directed by the CTAL. This is the first instance where a permanent staff member attended a national meeting, an indication of the interest the Confederacion General del Trabajo de Guatemala has for international Communist strategy.

Although prepared for December 1953 was postponed to January 1954. Prior to this date, Jose Manuel FORTUNY and Victor GUTIERREZ returned from the Vienna meeting of the WFTU and tours behind the Iron Curtain. They returned separately via Mexico City, where FORTUNY made a short stop-over and was in touch with LOMBARDO Toledano.

On 9 October 1953, Michael K. SAMOILOV, Commercial Attache of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, also assigned to Guatemala, had conferred directly with FORTUNY, SOLORZANO, and Ernesto CAPUANO, deputy director of the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security.

On 25 January, Pavlicek had a two-hour meeting with Mikhail CHERKASOV, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. On 29 January Pavlicek flew to Guatemala, where he spoke with delegates to the CGTG Congress. Following this, the Congress formally recommended establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations between Guatemala and Czechoslovakia. On 3 February Pavlicek presented his credentials to President ARBENZ.

3. THE SECOND STEP FOR THE CONTROL OF GUATEMALA: DIRECT SUPERVISION BY AGENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

At this stage in the development of complete Communist control, it must be remembered that most of the leading figures who emerged from the first period Communist penetration of Guatemala were only in their late twenties. They had similar backgrounds of mixed Spanish and Indian blood; their families were relatively poor, yet they had attained an educational level much higher than the average Guatemalan in these circumstances.

In spite of the fact that "old professionals" from other countries had been at their side all during the intial period, the doctrines of Lenin and Stalin taught at the Escuela Claridad, the Communist labor school, was still second-hand instruction; that is, the only reliable instruction as far as the Kremlin was concerned was in the Kremlin. Thus, the second stage of expansion and growth from 1947 up to the present was characterized by a constantly increasing volume of travel by the chosen elite of Guatemala to Eastern Europe and Moscow; their return generally heralded an acceleration or shift in local Party tactics and line. (The detail by this travel is being prepared as appendix to the present report.)

4. THE LAST STEP IN CONTROL BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISTS: COMPLETE ASSUMPTION OF THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

In the period following the election of President Arbenz communist activity and agitation grew stronger and bolder.

In labor, the leadership of the CGTG, gradually has come completely under the control of the PGT Political Committee. With the exception of a few independent local unions, it now represents all organized industrial, transportation, and commercial labor, and has a considerable number of agricutural workers' federations. Affiliation of the CGTG with the CTAL and WFTU in 1953 completed its passage into the Soviet-dominated camp.

The present administration's political strength comes from the "National Democratic Front," a coalition of the PAR, the RN, the PRG and the PGT. These four parties hold 51 of the 56 seats in Congress and virtually all government jobs are controlled by them. The PGT, smallest, but most cohesive of these parties, holds only 4 of the 51 seats yet positively controls the votes of all other members of the coalition. This has been accomplished by infiltration of Communist leaders into key positions of the other parties before coalition was accomplished.

The following government offices and agencies have been penetrated by Communists. The Publicity and Propaganda Department of the Presidency; Private Secretary to the President; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Communications; Secretary General of the President; the National Electoral Board; National Agrarian Council, the policy agenty of the National Agrarian Department, and the Guatemalan delegation to the UN. Members of the nucleus group of Communist leadership have been placed in the key positions of President of Congress, Director General of Radio Broadcasting, Director of the Institute of Social Security, Chief of Administration of National Agrarian Department, and Deputy Inspector General of Labor.

Through this penetration of the government, the Communists have been able to obtain funds for the support of various front activities. Official funds were used for the second Continental Conference of Democratic Lawyers and for the support of Communist propaganda in all the mass media of the country, and the travel of delegates to Peace Conferences.

Attachment No. 4

## IV. THE ROLE OF GUATEMALA IN THE SOVIET PLAN OF WORLD DOMINATION

Analysis of Communist penetration tactics in Guatemala indicates that the Soviet aim in the case of Guatemala is not to establish a satellite in Latin America, but to encourage and support complete Communist penetration of Guatemala as a base for increasing Communist activities in that area and expanding Communist penetration in other Latin American countries.

### Summary

The situation that exists in Guatemala today as a result of Communist activity in that country differs substantially from that created by Communist maneuvers in Eastern Europe during the early stages of Soviet takeover there. The Eastern European Communists possessed predominant instruments of physical power and enjoyed direct Russian support. Their Guatemalan colleagues have neither. The Communists in Guatemala presently lack the capability of molding the country into a Soviet satellite, and itseems unlikely that the Soviets would wish them to do so.

Most probably the events of the last weeks constitute a Communist effort to provoke the United States into an unwarranted reaction or to divert our attention and our efforts from areas of more immediate importance.

### Power Position of Guatemalan Communist Party

The strategy and tactics used by the Soviets in the subversion and takeover of the Eastern European states that are now their satellites varied from country to country. H wever, in every case of successful Soviet takeover two essential conditions were met. The first was that the Communists gained early and effective control over the instruments of physical power within the nation, and the second was that no external or foreign influences beyond the Communists' power to control could be brought against them to interfere with their program. In Eastern Europe, the Communists' prompt seizure of the police forces together with the presence of the Red Army gave them an overwhelming superiority of force in every case. The Communist efforts to take over Greece between 1946 and 1949 illustrates the course of events in an instance where these conditions were not met. The Greek Army was weakened but was still in existence and foreign aid was introduced to support it.

In Guatemala today neither of these two conditions for Communist takeover can be met. When gauged by its ability to take over and govern the country, the Guatemalan Communist Party's power position is extremely weak. The Army is the largest and most poweful armed force in the country. It is not controlled by the Party, and the material available here gives no indication that it has been extensively penetrated. The clear Communist domination of the police force and the major labor unions is not a counter balance to this instrument. The center of physical power does not lie with the Reds.

The danger of external influences interfering in any Communist move is high and it is bound to remain so. The danger comes not so much from political or military moves of Guatemala's neighbors. It comes rather from the fact that economically the country is wholly dependent on the export of its two staple crops--coffee and bananas. The nation's economic well-being, and indeed its very survival depend on its maintaining a steady market for these items and a means of transporting them to market.

Guatemala's major customer is the United States and almost all the shipping needed to move her produce is owned and managed by American interests. The appearance of an avowedly Communist regime in Guatemala would result in the withdrawal of American interests and a probably embargo closing the country's most important market. This in turn would result in the isolation of Guatemala and her rapid decline into something akin to bankruptcy.

The dislike of American interests is now so general within the country that many Guatemalan citizens would welcome the depature of the Yankee without thinking of the consequences, but it is certain that the leaders of the Communist Party realize the situation and see in the loss of American trade a real barrier to their overtly taking over the government and assuming responsibility for its effective management.

They doubtless remember the misforutnes of the Panama Communist Party in the period after World War II when it called for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from a number of wartime posts set up in that country. This happened to coincide with the wishes of the US command and the camps were evacuated in

record time. Initially, public opinion favored the Communist move but as the loss of income from the vacated posts became felt, opinion shifted, and since it was felt that the Party was responsible, its popular position was considerably weakened.

Objectives of Guatemalan Communist Party

Since the Guatemala Communists have neither the physical nor the economic power to effect a complete takeover, they face a far different and more difficult problem than that which confronted their colleagues in Eastern Europe in 1945 to 1948. Nevertheless, the Guatemalan Party uses many of the same techniques and tactics as were used from positions of greater strength in Europe. The Guatemalan Party can use these from weakness because its objectives are wholly different. It would not be in the Russian interest to make Guatemala a satellite in the accepted sense of the word for the Guatemalan Communist Party in its present ambiguous status is almost ideally organized and situated to serve Soviet ends.

Its primary purpose is to create a maximum amount of noise and nuisance, and its main efforts have been in the fields of propaganda dissemination and mass indoctrination. Press outlets, unions, and other mass organizations have been the targets. The Communists' unquestioned control of the police provides them with a valuable instrument to direct and control the activities of these groups but does not give them the strength needed to cope with the Army. The Communist-controlled units are those best suited to produce spectacular disturbances such as strikes, demonstrations and parades. They can disrupt the national life in expensive and perhaps ruinous ways, but for a country in Guatemala's position they hardly provide the foundations for a new state. They create and maintain an atmosphere of continuing Communist threat and pressure which is a constant irritant to the United States, and their activities enable the Party to present the rest of Latin American with a picture of devouring U. S. interests clinging doggedly to their profitable hold on the country. This spurious picture is then made a part of Communist propaganda throughout the world.

While the government itself remains nominally non-Communist, the nation's essential economic contracts can be kept up, and the issues which in clear-cut form might facilitate the organization of opposition remain satisfactorily befogged. American trade continues to provide the country with its life blood at the same time that American firms provide both the government and the Party with a very convenient political whipping boy. Thus the Guatemalan Communists achieve their noise and nuisance goal without assuming the dangers and losses that would follow a takeover of the sort seen in Eastern Europe.

Conclusions on Recent Events

In evaluating the events that have occureed in Guatemala during recent weeks, it becomes obvious that many of them are of a sort having particularly high news value in the United States. The Communists seem to be doing all that is in their power to draw attention to thbir maneuvers and are doing it in the one country that has the power to react sharply against them. This is highly irrational behavior for experienced political conspirators who are seriously seeking political power.

A priest with American connections was expelled from the country ashort time ago. His expulsion received wide attention in the American press, but there is no information available here that priests of other nationalities have as yet been expelled or that anti-religious activities within Guatemala have otherwise been stepped up. Two United States newsmen have been expelled, but it does not appear that any others have been bothered. In an interview on February 3, Foreign Minister Toriello referred to those two Americans as"special cases." Indded one of them appears to have been admitted to the country in order that he might be thrown out twenty-four hours later. The expulsion, of course, made a far better story and far more widely reported one thatn would have a mere refusal of an entry permit. The alledged plot involving Nicaragua and other Latin American states as well as ourselves was also a strong news story and received wide attention. It should be noted that the Guatemalan government hastened to exonerate Nicaragua while the story was still on front pages here.

It is at least a coincidence that the leaders of the non-Communist labor union in Guatemala were arrested while the AF of L Executive Council was in convention in Miami.

It seems almost certain that the primary purpose of this activity has been to anger and alarm the government and people of the United States. The Guatemalan Communists apparently hope to provoke some reaction from us or else to divert our attention to them from Communist activity elsewhere.

As the Department of State has suggested, the Guatemalan effort may be tied directly to the meetings in Caracas scheduled for March first. Any ill-considered American reaction to Guatemala's moves will seriously weaken our position with the other Latin American states. Many of these countries have deep and unpleasant memories of United States interference in past years. A statement by a U.S. official that might be construed as a threat of intervention, or a positive action such as a movement of forces to Panama would be grist for the Communist mill.

The danger that the recent flare up is diversionary is more serious. The power realities in Guatemala and throughout the Carribean area are such that these events constitute at most a tertiary danger to our security. In other parts of the world such as Indo-China the power balance is highly precarious and the potential benefits that the Soviets would derive from a victory are far higher. However, United States concern with Latin American integrity stems back to a time when we hardly knew of Indo-China's existence and an apparent threat to the area south of us still distracts us to a degree out of all proportion ~~ok~~ to the danger involved.

If, during a critical time, American attention and concern can be drawn to an area of relatively minor danger, the advantages to World Communism are all to obvious. These advantages will be increased if we can be induced to commit any part of our conventional military forces to a region where they are not urgently required and where their very presence will aggravate our difficulties.

Attachment No. 5

**Penetration of the Labor Movement**

Prior to the 1944 Revolution, there were no labor unions in Guatemala, other than controlled workingmen's national aid societies. Almost immediately after the revolution, however, a schoolteachers' union was founded, which evolved in January 1945 into the Sindicato de Trabajadores Educacionales de Guatemala (STEG). A short time later, the railwaymen's mutual benefit society was reorganized as Sindicato de Accion y Mejorimiento Ferrocarrillero (SAMF), and the labor movement was launched on a national scale with the organization of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG) in August 1945.

This was at first a leftist-nationalist movement without Communist orientation. The pre-1942 Communist party had been shattered by President UBICO, its activists killed, imprisoned or dispersed to other countries. There was thus no native organization, and it was necessary to reconstruct the party from the base. The seeds of the future Guatemalan Communist Party were planted within the CTG. Since there were no Guatemalan Communist labor leaders available to advise the budding organization and steer it in suitable directions, Communists from other Central American countries were imported. The principal foreign group consisted of Salvadoran exiles, including Miguel MARMOL Chicas, a Salvadoran Communist who is still associated with the local labor movement; Abel and Max CUENCA Martinez, brothers exiled from El Salvador in 1932 for Communist activities, the latter of whom is now a member of the Political Committee of PRG, and Office Manager of the IGSS; and Virgilio GUERRA Mendez, now a member of the PGT Political Committee. They were joined by two native Communists, Antonio OVANDO Sanchez, who had been imprisoned by UBICO, and Alfonso SOLORZANO Fernandez, who had fled to Mexico, where he worked with LOMBARDO Toledano.

These Communists, who had had labor union organizing experience in other countries, were the advisers of the young CTG. They quickly gained control of it, and established the Escuela Claridad as an indoctrination school, with Abel CUENCA as director. Its Communist orientation at length caused enough alarm

so that a factional fight split the CTG. SAMF and other unions withdrew in January 1946 and organized the Federacion Sindical de Guatemala (FSG), under the leadership of SAMF chief Arturo MORALES Cubas. In its first year, FSG outstripped the CTG in membership. The AREVALO government dealt the CTG another blow by formally closing the Escuela Claridad with a decree citing it as contravening Article 32 of the Guatemalan Constitution which forbids "political organizations of a foreign or international characters."

The Communist doctrines taught by the Escuela Claridad and by the Communist-oriented figures leading the labor movement exerted a considerable attraction upon the young students and others who were looking for a unified and firm ideology in the disoriented first period af the post-World War II "revolutionary" era. The present leaders of the Communist Party were at this time in their mid-twenties. They had similar backgrounds; they were of mixed Spanish and Indian blood; their familes were relatively poor, and they had attained an educational level higher than the average Guatemalan in thse circumstances.

A group led by Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ and consisting of persons associated with the Escuela Claridad gradually came to dominate the labor movement. The withdrawal of SAMF had left the teachers' union STEG as the most militant union in the CTG. GUTIERREZ rose rapidly from the STEG Executive Committee to the STEG Secretary Generalship, and thence to the position of Secretary General of the CTG.

Meanwhile, the Communist-oriented group also infiltrated the FSG, which had originally been formed in protest to the dominance of Communist doctrines in the CTG. The instrument of the FSG leftist turn was Manuel PINTO Usaga, a Communist-line opportunist who rose from the SAMF to the FSG Secretary General. By February 1947 a Comite Nacional de Unidad Sindical (CNUS) was founded to coordinate the actions of the CTG and FSG, and laid the foundations for a new united organization. GUTIERREZ' extreme leftist labor group worked hand in glove with Jose Manuel FORTUNY's extreme leftist political group, and many of the younger leaders, such as Jose Luis RAMOS, were active in both. Their activities were in the nature of two aspects of a single current rather than the activities of separate entities.

Effots toward creating a single, unified confederation of all Guatemalan workers were spark-plugged by international Communist labor leaders outside Guatemala. Jose MORERA, Cuban Secretary of the CTAL, was a frequent secret visitor to Guatemala. In May 1951 a Congress of Latin American Transport Workers was held in Guatemala as a facade for preparation for unification of the Guatemalan labor movement. Resolutions of the Congress concerned themselves primarily with Guatemalan labor problems, and the meeting also afforded an occasion for the presence in Guatemala of Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, Secretary General of the CTAL, and Louis SAILLANT, Secretary General of the WFTU.

In October 1951, the CTG and FSG brought to fruition the Confederacion General de Trabajadores (CGTG), with LOMBARDO and SAILLANT as midwives at the event. GUTIERREZ admitted that the organization of CGTG was a direct result of the activities of these two international Communists. At its founding Congress, the CGTG also voted a resolution of thanks to MORERA for all his efforts in its behalf.

Leadership of the CGTG is completely under the control of the PGT Political Committee. With the exception of a very few independent local unions, it represents all organized industrial, transportation, and commercial labor, and has a considerable number of agricultural workers' federations, including the union of the workers of the United Fruit Company plantations. Affiliation of the CGTG with the WFTU and the CTAL in 1953 completed its passage into the Soviet-dominated camp.

Key psoitions in the CGTG are all held by PGT members. GUTIERREZ, its Secretary General, is a member of the PGT Political Committee, and head of the PGT Cental Committee's Labor Union Commission. Jose Alberto CARDOZA, also of the PGT Political Committee, is First Vice Secretary General of CGTG. Carlos Manuel PELLECER, another PGT Political Committee member, is CGTG Secretary for Labor Disputes. In fact, the roster of CGTG officers is studied with the names of PGT members.

Besides controlling CGTG, the PGT exerts a strong ideological influence over the Confederacion Nacional Campesina de Guatemala, a national federation of hired farm workers, small tenant farmers, and small farmers. None of its presnet officers are publicly known to be members of the PGT. Its Communist ideological orientation stems from its Secretary General, Leonardo CASTILLO Flores. Although he is not a PTG member as far as is known, he has been active in the Communist "peace" movement, and has followed a far leftist line in his speeches. At present, the CNCG is closely affiliated with the left wing of the PAR, and the leaderships of the two organizations are interlocked: e.g., CASTILLO Flores is a member of the PAR Political Committee, and Guillermo OVANDO Arriola, the president of Congress, is concurrently CNCG Secretary for Agrarian Affairs and PAR Secretary for Organization.

The CGTG and the CNCG have become a key factor in politics: their representative are in the majority on the Local and Departmental Agrarian Committees under the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law, and three officers and several members of CGTG and CNCG are Deputies in Congress.

The Second Congress of the CGTG was held in January 1954 after several postponements. Prior to this date, Jose Manuel FORTUNY and Victor GUTIERREZ returned from the Vienna meeting of the WFTU and tours behind the Iron Curtain. They returned separately via Mexico City, where FORTUNY mad a short stopover and was in touch with LOMBARDO Toledano. Also prior to the Congress, the Guatemalan Ambassador in Mexico returned to his post from Guatemala with information from President ARBENZ for Vladimir PAVLICEK, Czech Minister in Mexico City, concerning a proposed trip by Pavlicek to Guatemala.

On 28 January, Pavlicek had a two-hour meeting with Mikhail CHERKASOV, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. On 29 January Pavlicek flew to Guatemala, where he spoke with delegates to the CGTG Congress. Following this, the Congress formally recommended establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations between Guatemala and Czechoslovakia. On 3 February Pavlicek presented his crddentials to President ARBENZ.

During the Congress, the Communist red flag flew beside the Guatemalan emblem over the building which housed the sessions. Delegates distributed banners denouncing "foreign intervention" by imperialist forces. Thus was presented a spectacle of a completely Communist-dominated Congress.

Attachement No. 6

Communist Capture and Manipulation of the Administration Political Parties

Outline

1. The administration's political strength derives from the "National Democratic Front" (Frente Democratico Nacional), a coalition composed of the Partido Accion Revolucionaria (PAR), the Partido de la Revolucion Guatemalteca (PRG), the Partido Renovacion Nacional (RN), and the Communist Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT). These four parties hold 51 of the 56 seats in Congress, and virtuall all government jobs are held by one or another of these parties. The smallest but most cohesive of these parties, the PGT, has only four of 51 congressional seats yet it controls the other member of the caolition.

2. Domination has been accomplished by the following means:

a. Infiltration of Communist leaders in key positions the other three parties before the PRG was officially launched.

b. Supplying guidance in the early post-revolutionary period through leaders who had been indoctrinated in Moscow (Fortuny, Roberto Alavarado Fuentes, Alfonso Solorzano).

c. Continuously maintaining contact with the executive and political committees of the other revolutionary parties through Communist collaborators.

(1) The PAR is currently headed by (Julio Estrada de la Hoz) a man who was hand-picked, trained, and given increasingly responsible positions by the Communists.

(2) The PRG is headed by a shrewd non-Communist politician (Charnaud MacDonald) who has collaborated closely with Communists when such action advanced his interests. He has on his Political Committee three people who are closely identified with promoting Communist objectives.

(3) The RN is headed by one of the betrayers of President ARBENZ although he insists, without definition of what he means, that he is "not a Communist." (Jaime Dias Rozzotto)

d. Applying the "divide and rule" tactic of playing on the rivalries and jealousies of the other parties to keep a dominant non-Communist group from developing among the non-Communist rank and file of these three parties.

(1) From 1944 to 1952 the issue of Communism itself was an important factor in keeping the parties divided, as each had a "pro-Communist" and a "non-Communist" wing.

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(2) The struggle of these two wings dominated the internal affairs of the PAR and the RN with the most pro-Communist faction gradually winning in both.

(3) In 1951, factional fights in the PAR resulted in a schism and the splinter group founded the Socialist Party.

(4) In 1952, an announcement that non-Communist minority groups within the three parties would form a "single" revolutionary party under the PRG was frustrated by PCG propaganda attacks against the leaders of the plan, calling accusing them of being "rightist deviatio

Attachment No. 7

**Communist Penetration of the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security**

Alfonso SOLORZANO Fernandez Director General

SOLORZANO is, by his profession as well as his activities, a convinced Communist, although he has never openly joined the PGT. He is an accomplished Marxist intellectual, and a labor organizer and agitator of long experience. As a young law student, he was sent to Mexico City by President UBICO, who gave him a position in the embassy to provide financial aid for his studies. However, his friendships with Communists and leftists became so pronounced that UBICO cancelled the aid.

In Mexico City, SOLORZANO came under the direct invluence of Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, and at one time served as LOMBARDO's secretary. He also taught labor law, theory, and practice in the Workers' University in Mexico City, and headed a group of Communists which actively distributed propaganda directed against UBICO. After the 1944 revolution SOLORZANO returned to Guatemala. Prior to his departure from Mexico, he was in frequent contact with the Russian Embassy in the capital. He was also instrumental in obtaining financial aid from LOMBARDO Toledano to assist the return of Juan Jose AREVALO from exile to the presidency.

He was a member of the Communist Party of Mexico, but was expelled, on the ground, he says, that he disagreed with the theories of Earl Browder, US Communist leader during World War II. By his own admission, he continues to be a confirmed Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist.

His wife was a mistreee of former President AREVALO, and during that president's administration he served as Secretary to the Presidency.

A chronology of his activities follows:

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| 1943 | Acted as Communist organzer in Central America. |
| 1944 | Became one of the principal leaders of the Vanguardia Nacional, an extreme leftist political party. |
| | Was an organizer of CTG. |

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| 1945 | Exiled; went to El Salvador and Mexico, where he received financial support from Soviet and Marxist sources. Following his return to Guatemala, upon AREVAL's election, he wrote the chapter on social guarantees in the 1945 Constitution. |
| 1950 | Delegate to World Peace Congress in Paris. Contacted Manuel HUBNER Richardson while the latter was in Guatemala. |
| 1950 | Named Secretary General of the Guatemalan Committee of the Partisans of Peace (Comite Guatemalteco por la Paz y la Democracia). |
| April 1950 | Was on reception committee to welcome Pablo NERUDA, Chilean Communist poet, to Guatemala. |
| September 1950 | Signed a petition demanding rejection of the Rio Treaty by the Guatemalan Congress. |
| April 1951 | Elected Administrator of the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social, IGSS) following ouster of the incumbent, engineered by outgong President AREVALO and president-elect ARBENZ. In December 1950, when ARBENZ was asked by the Board of Directors of the Institute as to his wishes in connection with the continuance in office of Oscar BARAHONA Streber, he stated that he wished BARAHONA to serve out his term. Subsequently, however, AREVALO, while still President, requested ARBENZ to withdraw his support from BARAHONA, and to give it to SOLORZANO. ARBENZ complied, as a favor to AREVALO and in partial payment of his political debt to the PAR. |

Meanwhile, a concerted campaign of character assassination was laucnhed against BARAHONA, with

official and semi-official newspapers circulating innuendos about his financial record in the Institute, his alleged service to reactionaries during the time he had been in Guatemala, and mentioning the name of US Ambassador Patterson.

Pressure in various forms was brought to bear on the Board members to vote SOLORZANO's election, and thus to lend the unsavory affair an aura of respectability. The Employers' Representative was promised that he would be made President of the Board in exchange for his vote. The Represenative of the University acquiesced to avoid displeasing the government. Two of the Board members resigned following this series of events.

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| May 1951 | Headed "Peace" Rally. |
| June 1951 | Appeared on platform at the Communist Party's first public meeting. |
| May 1951 | Appointed Abel CUENCA Martinez, a well-known Guatemalan Communist, as Office Manager of the IGSS. This appointment was the prelude in later wholesale appointment of Communists to the agency. |
| 1952 | Member of PRG "Political Bureau". |
| May 1952 | Although he was not a member of the Special Congressional Committee on Agrarian Reform, he and Jose Manuel FORTUNY dominated consideration of the Agrarian Reform Bill by that body. |
| July 1952 | SOLORZANO was attacked by DIAZ Rozzotto and others when they withdrew PAR from PRG, on the ground that he (SOLORZANO) had "failed loyally to defend PAR from rightist deviationist currents." |
| November 1952 | Spoke at First National Conference on Social Security, held under thinly-veiled Communist auspices, and on a platform that was made up entirely of Communists. |

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| June 1953 | Appointed Editor of Diario del Pueblo, official organ of the PRG. Helped make up financial losses of a dance sponsored by the pro-Communist Peace Committee. |
| 1953 | Stated that, although he was expelled from the Communist Party of Mexico, he has been and continues to be a confirmed Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist. Deplored "secretarianis of the Guatemalan Communists. |
| | SOLORZANO's editing of Diario del Pueblo criticized by CHARNAUD MacDonald on the ground that its political line was Marxist-Communist. CHARNAUD tried at first to offset SOLORZANO's influence by appointing staff writers and clerks who supported CHARNAUD, but SOLORZANO removed them for lack of ability. When the movement against SOLORZANO became strong, a meeting was called to depose him as editor, but the Communists and Communist sympathizers in the PRG defeated the petition to remove him. |
| November 1953 | Offered support of PRG to a Communist Party project for establishment of a bank for foreign trade. |

Attitudes Toward SOLORZANO:

Leading Guatemalan Communists are apparently not entirely sympathetic to SOLORZANO. Some resent him as an "intelectuale" and "profesionalista"; others scorn him for his expulsion from the Communist Party of Mexico. SOLORZANO has been attacked by GUTIERREZ and PELLECER, who have harried his activities in the IGSS, and by FORTUNY, who called him a "rightist deviationist." He once had the support of CHARNAUD MacDonald, but that PRG leader has lately objected to SOLORZANO's Marxist orientation.

SOLORZANO and the IGSS

SOLORZANO has no qualifications for his present position as administrator of the IGSS, and neither have the many Communists he has appointed to positions in the Institute. The IGSS has been recklessly exploited for political ends, and under its present management this one valuable result of the 1944 Revolution may end as a failure.